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Abstract. This paper critically assesses the possibility of moral enhance-
ment with ambient intelligence technologies and artiﬁcial intelligence presented
in Savulescu and Maslen (2015). The main problem with their proposal is that
it is not robust enough to play a normative role in users’ behavior. A more
promising approach, and the one presented in the paper, relies on an artiﬁ-
cial moral reasoning engine, which is designed to present its users with moral
arguments grounded in ﬁrst-order normative theories, such as Kantianism or
utilitarianism, that reason-responsive people can be persuaded by. This pro-
posal can play a normative role and it is also a more promising avenue towards
moral enhancement. It is more promising because such a system can be designed
to take advantage of the sometimes undue trust that people put in automated
technologies. We could therefore expect a well-designed moral reasoner system
to be able to persuade people that may not be persuaded by similar arguments
from other people. So, all things considered, there is hope in artiﬁcial intelli-
gence for moral enhancement, but not in artiﬁcial intelligence that relies solely
on ambient intelligence technologies.
Keywords: moral enhancement, artiﬁcial intelligence, rhetoric, ambient intelli-
gence.
1. The moral lag problem and moral enhancement
In a notorious opening section to the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle tells
us that only those already brought up well and in possession of the moral
virtues can engage in the study of ethics (Nicomachean Ethics 1095b4–6).
If Aristotle is right, children who are not educated and socialized in the
right way early in their development will inevitably lead a crippled moral
life, if not be outright vicious. Whatever one thinks of Aristotle’s views, it is
diﬃcult to resist at least the spirit, if not the letter of that grim assessment.
There is a lot of evidence that bad behavior and bad environments correlate
and even evidence that bad environments lead to signiﬁcant neuroanatom-
ical changes (Glenn and Raine 2014).
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The explanation of this state of aﬀairs is not to be found exclusively
in the way that children are brought up. Even with the right development,
conﬂicts between moral judgments and rationality broadly construed are
common. As McIntyre points out, “in the presence of powerful contrary
inclinations that bring about a failure to be resolute, resisting rationaliza-
tion and remaining clearheaded about one’s reasons to act can constitute
a modest accomplishment” (MacIntyre 2006, 311). Summing up, Aristotle’s
view about engaging in the study of ethics and in leading a moral life stays
pertinent at least in spirit: it is diﬃcult to be moral.
There are reasons to think that leading a moral life is even more diﬃ-
cult today than in Aristotle’s time. Many contemporary societies face rapid
technological advance and moral practice is not catching up. Some urge
that the moral psychology that we inherited from our ancestors leaves us
unprepared to confront moral issues raised by the advent of computers,
biotechnology, and new forms of medicine. We can be disposed to morally
ignore anonymous, large groups of people and care only about those clos-
est to us (Meyer, Masten et al. 2012). We can be apathetic towards enor-
mous amounts of suﬀering and put too much emphasis on the relatively
lower suﬀering of individuals who may be physically or socially closer to us
(Slovic 2010).
Let us call the sum of these problems the Moral Lag Problem. The Moral
Lag Problem is a shorthand name for all the things that cause us to be not
as moral as we could or should be. Persson and Savulescu, among others,
see this situation not only as unfortunate, but as an existential threat to
our species (Persson and Savulescu 2011). They argue that this particular
set of moral shortcomings will inevitably lead to calamities like global eco-
logical disaster or apocalyptic wars and possibly even destroy life on Earth
(Rees 2004).
What may not be immediately apparent is that technological advance
may also hold a solution to the Moral Lag Problem. Technology may be used
to change the environment in a way that makes it easier for people to act
morally. Technology may also be used to change moral agents themselves
in a way that makes it easier for them to act morally – this is the idea
that Parsson and Savulescu take up in their proposal for wholesale moral
bioenhancement.
Solutions to the Moral Lag Problem that focus on changing the environ-
ment come in many forms, most of which aim to dampen or even eliminate
the eﬀects of environmental stimuli that may lead to morally compromis-
ing behavior (Van den Hoven, Lokhorst et al. 2012). For example, street
lights that make people less aggressive or restaurant advertisements that
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oﬀer morally relevant information, such as whether the food is “fair trade”
or locally produced. Whatever in the environment causes people to be less
moral than they could be – new technologies, foibles of their psychology,
or vicious socialization – may have less of an eﬀect with such measures
in place.
Solutions that focus on changing the agent are as diverse (Persson
and Savulescu 2013). Pharmaceuticals, such as serotonin re-uptake in-
hibitors (Crockett 2014), modafanil (de Sio, Faulmu¨ller et al. 2014), and
oxytocin (De Dreu 2012) all have been proposed as possible interven-
tions that would lead to moral improvement in the people that take them.
There are also possible direct neural interventions into relevant brain ar-
eas (Baertschi 2014). Some have also proposed genetic manipulation (De-
Grazia 2013; Harris 2010). Finally, there are the more old-fashioned meth-
ods, such as moral education (Harris 2013).
A seldom considered but promising solution to the Moral Lag Problem
lies with rapid technological advances in computing technology and artiﬁcial
intelligence (AI) in particular. Savulescu and Maslen have argued that it
can be a route to moral enhancement (Savulescu and Maslen 2015). In their
view, “the moral AI would monitor physical and environmental factors that
aﬀect moral decision-making, would identify and make agents aware of their
biases, and would advise agents on the right course of action, based on the
agent’s moral values” (Savulescu and Maslen 2015, 80). Along similar lines,
Borenstein and Arkin have given concrete examples of the way in which
an AI implemented in a robot can serve as a moral nudger (Borenstein
and Arkin 2016).
This paper examines some of the available engineering options that can
achieve this aim and concludes that the most promising approach will bor-
row from extant work in machine ethics and be coupled with extant engineer-
ing solutions in AI, such as those proposed by Savulescu and Maslen among
others. This is a unique new possibility for changing the agent morally and
presents the main original contribution of the present work.
Section 2 critically examines the ways in which a moral AI could be
implemented and tasked with moral enhancement using extant technologies,
and focuses on the work of Savulescu and Maslen. Section 3 demonstrates
how a better solution may be found in machine ethics coupled with AI
and lays out the idea of an AI adviser that can generate moral arguments
based on standard ﬁrst-order normative theories.1 Section 4.1 considers an
objection to this proposal, which is the charge that such an AI module
would be an unacceptable form of moral paternalism, and then Section 4.2
answers that objection.
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2. Moral enhancement with artiﬁcial intelligence
Savulescu and Maslen’s (2015) proposal for a moral AI has two impor-
tant features. First, it is a complex of subsystems: a moral environment mon-
itor, which provides morally-relevant information about one’s surroundings;
a moral prompter, which informs the user about morally important situa-
tions or events in the environment; a moral adviser, which nudges the user
to what they should do; and a moral observer, which observes the behavior
of the user (Savulescu and Maslen 2015, 84).
Second, the functioning of these systems is to some extent determined
by exogenous interference from the user. For example, the user can set up
which values the various subsystems should prioritize over others. It may
be useful to quote them here at length to make it clear what it is that they
have in mind:
Before oﬀering advice in the ﬁrst instance, the AI would ask the agent to in-
dicate which of a long list of morally signiﬁcant values or principles he holds
and is guided by. Importantly, he is also asked to assign a weight (between 0
and 1) to each value. Thus, an agent who cared very strongly about not harm-
ing others (non-malevolence), a bit about not breaking the law (legality) and
not at all about protecting the environment (environmental protection) might
assign them weights of 1, 0.5 and 0, respectively. We suggest a non-exhaustive
list of possible values to include:
– Autonomy (of others – e.g. not being paternalistic)
– Benevolence (helping others)
– Non-malevolence (not harming others)
– Justice/fairness
– Legality
– Environmental protection
– Family/signiﬁcant relationships
– Fulﬁlling duties/commitments/promises
– Maximising net utility (making sure overall beneﬁts outweigh overall
costs)
For any given scenario, the AI would compute the extent to which the courses
of action open to the agent would uphold or compromise these values (fully
uphold value = 1; fully compromise value = –1), amplifying or diminishing
based on the weight indicated by the agent. The AI would then use these
weighed values to suggest the best course of action (Savulescu and Maslen
2015, 88).
These settings can also be adjusted by the system to reﬂect what the user
does. For example, if the user acts in a way that prioritizes Legality over
Justice/fairness, the system would adjust its settings to reﬂect that in its
future operation.
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It may also be important to emphasize that Savulescu and Maslen pro-
pose an AI in its weak version. Weak AI, as opposed to strong AI, does not
aim at human-level cognition in a computer, but merely at using the tech-
niques in the ﬁeld of AI to generate better software. Strong moral AI would
presumably aim at the level of moral agency or at least a human-level ca-
pacity for moral reasoning. Weak moral AI “gathers, computes and updates
data to assist human agents with their moral decision-making” (Savulescu
and Maslen 2015, 84).
Their proposal for a new type of moral enhancement is for a moral
AI that would be proﬁled to pick-up, process, and present morally relevant
information to the human user. This proposal has the virtue of relying on
technologies that have all been either developed or are in the process of being
developed as a part of ongoing research programs into ambient technologies
and aﬀective computing (Picard 2000). However, it faces the problem of
being too tied up with the values of its users and not being able to provide
a solution to the Moral Lag Problem.
This becomes apparent when we look into the details of the function-
ing of the proposal’s subsystems. For one, the purportedly morally rele-
vant information that the moral environment monitor provides is likely
to be morally relevant only for particular individuals in particular situa-
tions, if at all. Most morally relevant information about food may not be
all that important to someone who is desperately hungry, on a special diet,
or a nutritionist.
Similarly with the information provided by the moral prompter, which
could, for example, “prompt agents faced with justice/fairness decisions to
mitigate gender biases by making themselves gender-blind where possible”
(Savulescu and Maslen 2015, 88). Information about gender bias may not
be important to someone that cares about it a great deal already.
If the agent has overcome these biases or does not feel that overcoming
them is a part of their moral values, then the AI’s advice becomes altogether
useless. On the other hand, if the agent cares about these values, then it
is not clear what the AI adds that their own reﬂective attitude to gender-
bias would not. In order to have the moral prompter prompt in a morally
relevant manner, it would have to have an insight into the moral values of
the person beyond whatever platitudes it may have received in the process of
its creation or it would simply need to have the right moral values, whatever
those are.
Finally, the moral adviser module, which seems to be the heart of the
moral AI, may be informed:
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that high levels of testosterone and sleep deprivation are factors that make
individuals more likely to make utilitarian decisions (to over-value maximizing
net utility), [and thus] warn the agent that, for this reason, his current as-
sessment of the advised course of action may not be consonant with his more
enduring moral principles (Savulescu and Maslen 2015, 88–9).
But the moral adviser module would not be giving good advice if the agent’s
more enduring moral principles are wrong or if the agent is biased. It is
also possible that in some situations over-valuing net utility is the morally
right thing to do and the moral adviser would actually impede rather than
enhance moral behavior if it gave advice against it.
In sum, the key problem with the proposal is that all of the component
parts of the moral AI are systematically tied up to the agent’s own moral
values and these values might be based on morally compromising biases and
beliefs. In response, the authors may stress the value of moral pluralism,
which is not the same as relativism, and point out that “common human
morality, whilst not always in agreement on ﬁner points, does require some
objective standards” (Savulescu and Maslen 2015, 91). Pluralism avoids
paternalism and preserves the agent’s autonomy.
Moral relativism is the view that moral values are relative and thus
mind-dependent properties. Relativism has signiﬁcant theoretical and em-
pirical problems that are outside of the scope of this paper to discuss. One of
the most troubling is that any value, including the most abhorrent, can end
up being moral if relativism is true. Given this, if Savulescu and Maslen’s
proposal implies relativism, it would put it at a disadvantage.
Moral pluralism, on the other hand, is the view that moral values are
diverse, which suggests that there is no one single ethical or metaethical
theory that is correct, but that we may use some or all of them to reach
morally justiﬁed conclusions. This view is compatible with moral realism and
the view that moral properties are mind-independent. Given what we know
about the proposed AI, it is clear that it functions in a morally pluralistic
way – each user can select their own settings for values. That, however, is
not the same as saying that any values would do, so the proposal is not
relativistic.
This response goes some way in answering the worry, but it opens the
proposal to another objection, namely, that the moral AI they propose will
not lead to moral enhancement. Savulescu and Maslen urge that not only
does the proposed moral AI preserve the agent’s moral autonomy, it in fact
enhances it by prompting the agent to reﬂect on and assent to moral values
and principles, and by equipping the agent to be more successfully guided by
the values and principles he endorses (Savulescu and Maslen 2015, 91). But
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this is simply not enough to face up to the Moral Lag Problem in a serious
way. To do that, the moral AI would have to play not only an advisory or
facilitative role, but also a normative one.
Imagine a situation in which a hypothetical person, a white American
male named John, could report that he just saw a police oﬃcer verbally
abusing a Chinese person. Minimally, we would expect John to report the
police oﬃcer’s behavior to someone, so the police oﬃcer could be repri-
manded. But John will not do even this, because of his bias against Chinese
people. John has been socialized to have this bias in his childhood by racist
parents, friends, and neighbors.
John is then hooked up with a moral AI with all of its diﬀerent sub-
systems, as presented by Savulescu and Maslen, and faced with an identical
situation. Could we expect John’s behavior to be any diﬀerent than the
ﬁrst time? That depends on why it is that John did not report the abuse
the ﬁrst time.
If John’s not reporting was due to an unconscious bias against Chinese
people, then there is a chance that he may act diﬀerently now that the moral
AI gives him more information about the situation at hand. However, we
have good reason to believe that John’s not reporting was due to reasons
John knows about and which are grounded in his bias against Chinese peo-
ple. If this latter possibility is what actually happened, then the moral AI
is unlikely to change how John acts.
To see this consider how the diﬀerent modules function. The moral
environment monitor in the AI may tell John that the person is Chinese
and that that is morally relevant. John, being a racist, would probably
recognize this as helpful, in that it helped him recognize that he should not
report the police oﬃcer’s abuse. This is how racism works.
The moral prompter may also tell John that this is a situation in which
he is faced with a moral dilemma that involves reacting appropriately to an
observed transgression of laws by someone else. John may ﬁnd it helpful to
know that this is a situation where laws are broken by the police oﬃcer, but
he would also be compelled by his racist views to not do anything about it.
Again, this is how racism works.
In fact, we have a good reason to think John would be compelled by his
racist values to rationalize the police oﬃcer’s transgression away. It would
be more than a modest accomplishment, to use MacIntyre’s phrase, if John
resisted rationalization and remained clearheaded about his reasons for act-
ing. It is easy to ﬁnd examples of such rationalization at work. For example,
in Duluth, Minnesota in 1920 a lynch mob was prompted by police oﬃcers
that lynching African Americans for purportedly assaulting a white woman
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is a transgression of US laws (Fedo 2016). Nonetheless, that did not stop
the lynching.
The moral adviser module would also ultimately fail to change John’s
behavior in the critical moment. From the list of values provided by
Savulescu and Maslen, presumably the ones relevant to John’s situation
would be justice/fairness and benevolence. For the sake of argument, let us
say that John cares a great deal about these and assigns them maximum
weight in the moral AI. This would make the moral adviser AI “compute
the extent to which the courses of action open to the agent would uphold
or compromise these values” (Savulescu and Maslen 2015, 88). The moral
adviser may therefore advise John that his values of justice/fairness and
benevolence recommend a course of action that includes reporting the po-
lice oﬃcer’s abuse.
However, it is highly unlikely that John would act diﬀerently given this
advice from the AI. It is well-known that racists typically dehumanize or
devalue those against whom they are prejudiced and rationalize conﬂicts
between their racism and their other values by “othering” (Dominelli 1998).
This involves putting emphasis on the diﬀerences of the other person and
then drawing the conclusion that these diﬀerences are essential, morally
relevant properties, which somehow justify treating the other diﬀerently
than they would have been otherwise.
Like any other racist, John would likely do something like this when
confronted with the hypothetical situation, even if advised by his moral
AI adviser not to do so. We could also expect that if the AI attempts to
change the weights assigned to John’s values of justice and benevolence to
compensate for John’s failure to act, John would protest. In his eyes, John
cares about justice and benevolence a great deal, but Chinese people just do
not count in certain situations, because they are “other” in some way. Given
what we know about racist psychology, we have no reason to think that John
would act any diﬀerent if he was prompted or advised by the moral AI.
The racist John example easily generalizes to other situations where
people may act immorally due to the sorts of things that are at the heart
of the Moral Lag Problem. For example, persons disposed to violent con-
frontation when challenged by a lifetime in an environment where that kind
of behavior is encouraged are unlikely to change when prompted by an AI
that they are about to get into a confrontation. If informed by a system
that monitors their autonomous nervous system that they may be get-
ting angry they are more likely to take it as a suggestion to get ready
for a ﬁght rather than reﬂect on the moral dimension of their decisions or
behavior.
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Being prompted to reﬂect on information from the environment or moral
values and principles one endorses is not suﬃcient to lead one to act morally
in situations where doing the morally right thing conﬂicts with these values.
So while Savulescu and Maslen’s proposal that the AI be systematically
tied to the agent’s own moral values avoids the problem of paternalism and
preserves autonomy, it also precludes the AI from playing a normative role.
And this means that the system they propose is not robust enough to achieve
even modest moral enhancement and certainly not on a scale that would
be suﬃcient to overcome the Moral Lag Problem. We have good reason to
expect that people enhanced with this AI will go on doing whatever they
were doing.
3. Machine ethics and moral enhancement
The more promising alternative for changing behavior by an AI lies in
machine ethics. Machine ethics, in the sense relevant to the present dis-
cussion, is an interdisciplinary project that has as its aim the creation of
a computer program that can engage in moral reasoning (Anderson and
Anderson 2011). Moral reasoning leads a moral agent to make moral deci-
sions based on relevant reasons, broadly construed. Machine ethics aims to
implement that in a computer.
A computer program that can engage in moral reasoning could play
a normative role in a way in which the moral AI discussed in the previous
section could not. First of all, such a system can give suggestions on how to
behave in concrete situations. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, such
a system could give reasons that a rational person could be persuaded by.
Thirdly, it can, if prompted to do so, give answers to ﬁrst-order normative
questions, such as “should I report this to the authorities?” with a deﬁnite
“yes” or “no” and then also provide reasons in support of that answer.
Now let us suppose that racist John is hooked up to an AI system
that can do all three of these things: give suggestions, give reasons, and
give answers to ﬁrst-order normative questions. So, in addition to being in-
formed about the moral environment, prompted about the moral dimension
of a police oﬃcer abusing a Chinese person, being advised about this being
a situation that involves breaking laws, and so on, John is also being ex-
plicitly informed about what he should do, morally speaking, and why. For
example, the AI would suggest to John that he should report this abuse to
some authorities or, if he is willing to go beyond what is minimally morally
required of him, that he tell the police oﬃcer to stop, because that would
maximize happiness or something like that.
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Racist John would of course likely ignore this sort of advice. But if he
does, the AI would be able to give him reasons why he should not ignore it.
For example, the AI could generate an argument that starts with some un-
controversial premises and leads to the conclusion that not reporting the
police oﬃcer’s abuse is immoral. This argument may take as premises Kan-
tian deontological theory, utilitarianism, Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness,
or some other normative theory. It could choose one of these or all of them
at once, perhaps depending on the moral philosophy closest to John’s, or
perhaps on some other non-arbitrary reason that informed the engineers
responsible for designing the system.
Racist John is still likely to resist even these AI-generated arguments.
However, if John is in any way reason-responsive and cares about moral-
ity, he is forced to confront the conﬂict that they generate. This is because
John’s racist ideology, like any other racist ideology, is, at least arguably,
incompatible with ethical theories like Kant’s, utilitarianism, and so on.
So John has to respond to this conﬂict either by deciding to act on the
reasons provided by the AI or by intentionally rejecting these reasons in
favor of his racist beliefs. John could also accept both, even though they are
contradictory, but he would still at least be made aware that they are in con-
ﬂict. Either way, in this situation John cannot simply rationalize away the
immorality of what is happening in front of him by “othering” or something
else like it.
All things considered, John is still likely to favor his racist beliefs over
the reasons provided by the AI or resign himself to having beliefs in contra-
dictory things. But there are two important diﬀerences between his state of
mind now that he has been advised by the AI that can engage in moral rea-
soning and his state of mind after being advised, informed, and prompted
by the AI proposed by Savulescu and Maslen. First, now John is aware of
the conﬂict between his racism and ethical theory. This gives him a gen-
uine opportunity to change his mind in light of reasons that he can ratio-
nally accept. Second, there is a chance, however small, that John will trust
the AI more than his racist beliefs and act on the moral reasons provided
by the AI.
The second possibility, which is that John would listen to the AI over
his own racist beliefs, is particularly promising. There is empirical evidence
that strongly suggests that people can be successfully persuaded to change
their behavior by appropriately designed technologies (Hamari, Koivisto
et al. 2014). Given a wealth of evidence of technology for behavior change,
we have some reason to hope that a similar eﬀect can be used in cases such
as racist John’s.
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If the agent-computer relationship is appropriately groomed, people
can trust computers very much in the way that they can trust each other
(Muir 1987, Nickel 2013). Agent-computer trust can be especially high when
it comes to automation, sometimes even to the detriment of human agents,
who may end up trusting an automated system when not appropriate (Para-
suraman, Molloy et al. 1993). This means that agent-computer trust can be
managed to some extent and match or even outrun levels of agent-agent
trust (Lee and See 2004).
What may explain the diﬀerence between agent-agent and agent-
computer trust is that one of the operative psychological mechanisms for
dealing with uncertainty in agent-agent interactions is aﬀect, while in agent-
computer interactions, the operative psychological mechanism is conﬁdence
(de Vries 2004). Conﬁdence in the performance of an artifact, such as a com-
puter program or an automated airplane pilot, often depends on non-social
factors such as past performance (Carlson, Desai et al. 2014, Sauer, Chavail-
laz et al. 2015). Agent-agent trust, on the other hand, engages many dis-
parate mechanisms, such as social cognition and emotions, which renders it
subject to a number of biases (Emerson 1976).
The sometimes undeserving trust that people put in technology, espe-
cially automated technology that is designed to generate conﬁdence in the
user, can be exploited in an appropriately designed moral reasoning AI to
persuade people like racist John to change their behavior. While John is
unlikely to listen to reasons and arguments given by another person, extant
evidence suggests that he may well listen to reasons and arguments from
a machine. Machine advice may override John’s distrust in people advice.
So we have a reason to think that a system that can advise and give rea-
sons would be more successful in changing behavior than the kind of system
proposed by Savulescu and Maslen.
This system would have to take advantage of the best research on
human-computer interaction and the psychological mechanisms of agent-
computer trust to work. This is in addition to the daunting engineering
challenges that face the project of creating an artiﬁcial moral reasoner,
which could supply people with reasons and arguments. All of this implies
a massive amount of research, which may never be carried out. Nonetheless,
the potential for addressing the Moral Lag Problem is there.
Generalizing the proposed solution with adequate attention paid to cus-
tomization and user experience is a promising avenue for overcoming dispo-
sitions to behave immorally on a large scale. This is because a moral AI can
play a normative role and provide reasons that rational, reason-responsive
people can be persuaded by. While the advice from the moral AI proposed
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here is not likely to change the behavior of groups bound on doing harm,
like the one in 1920 Duluth, Minnesota, it does give a promising alterna-
tive to pharmaceuticals and neural intervention for individualized moral
enhancement.
4.1. Paternalism and autonomy: objection
The main problem with the moral AI proposed by Savulescu and Maslen
lies in its systematic connection with the values of its user. This connection
makes it diﬃcult for the AI to play a normative role necessary to seriously
address the Moral Lag Problem. The virtue of the AI having a connection
to the values of its user is that it allows for moral pluralism, which in turn
avoids the problem of moral paternalism. Paternalism
is the interference of a state or an individual with another person, against their
will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will
be better oﬀ or protected from harm. The issue of paternalism arises with
respect to restrictions by the law such as anti-drug legislation, the compulsory
wearing of seatbelts, and in medical contexts by the withholding of relevant
information concerning a patient’s condition by physicians (Dworkin 2016).
Similarly in the context of moral AI, the issue of paternalism arises because
the moral AI interferes with the person that uses it on the assumption that
it would be better for them to be interfered with in that way.
Whether paternalism is problematic depends on the nature of the in-
terference with the person. As Gerald Dworkin points out,
in the case of automobile seat belts, for example, the restriction is trivial in
nature, interferes not at all with the use or enjoyment of the activity, and does,
I am assuming, considerably reduce a high risk of serious injury. Whereas, for
example, making mountain-climbing illegal completely prevents a person from
engaging in an activity which may play an important role in his life and his
conception of the person he is (Dworkin 1972, 83).
Dworkin observes that mountain-climbing can play an important role in the
conception of the kind of person one is. One can conceive of themselves
as a mountain-climber or a passionate hobbyist of mountain-climbing. In-
terfering with that conception constitutes paternalistic intereference that
undermines autonomy.
Dworkin’s observation about activities, such as mountain-climbing, can
be extended to beliefs. Some beliefs can play an important role in one’s life
and how one conceives of themselves. Good examples of such beliefs are
religious beliefs or beliefs about values, which can for some people even be
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central to that conception. Sadly, among these core beliefs one can some-
times ﬁnd racist beliefs, such as John’s. Racism can be a value that people
hold central to the conception of who they are.
This connection between some beliefs and one’s conception of the kind of
person one is creates a problem for paternalistic interference. Paternalistic
interference that has as its aim a change in beliefs may undermine that
conception and violate autonomy (Shiﬀrin 2000). Some philosophers argue
that even if interference of this kind is motivated by the need for moral
enhancement, everyone should be given the freedom to fall (Harris 2011,
DeGrazia 2013). Racist John should have the freedom to hold racist beliefs.
Left unanswered the objection eliminates the motivation for having an
AI that can engage in moral reasoning and play a normative role in human
behavior. If the moral AI proposed in Section 3 is paternalistic in a way
that infringes on autonomy, then it is not an improvement on Savulescu
and Maslen’s proposal, but a step in the wrong direction.
4.2. Paternalism and autonomy: reply
The paternalism objection can be answered by stressing that while the
moral reasoner AI does interfere in the conception of oneself, it does so in
a way that does not undermine autonomy. The relevant distinction here is
between methods of paternalistic interference in the conception of oneself
that coerce and those that persuade. Coercion strips agents of their say in the
constitution of their conception of themselves, thus violating autonomy. Per-
suasion leaves it up to them to decide, which means that agents undergoing
paternalistic interference of this kind in some sense consent to the change.
The moral reasoner AI presented in Section 3 falls into the latter category.
Persuasion with sophistical arguments has a bad reputation in philoso-
phy and has been criticized by Plato (Republic 382d-e, Gorgias 500a–503c),
Thomas Hobbes (De Cive 2.12.11–12), and Immanuel Kant (Critique of
Judgment, sec. 53, 328), among many others. This tradition suggests that
persuasion of this kind is at best an art and at worst it undermines autonomy
and appeals to the most base aspects of human psychology to bamboozle un-
suspecting interlocutors. If this is what the moral AI reasoner does as well,
then the paternalism objection indeed hits its mark.
But there is also a tradition that springs from Aristotle’s Rhetoric,
which urges that persuasion with non-scientiﬁc arguments is not only com-
patible with personal autonomy, but that it plays an important role in moral
and political discourse (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, Dow 2015).
Aristotle agrees with Plato that rhetoric can be used to take advantage of
people – sophistry can be a type of intellectual coercion – but he also sees
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rhetoric as the best way to appeal to people that are not persuaded by
scientiﬁc argument (Rhetoric 1355a24–26, 1356a20–33).
In this latter tradition we can distinguish cases where autonomy is re-
spected, in which case we have rational persuasion from cases where auton-
omy is not respected and we have rational manipulation. Rational manipu-
lation occurs when:
one might introduce reasons into a person’s deliberations in order to play on
her neuroses (or simple, individual preoccupations) so as to impede her delib-
eration and control the likelihood of a certain outcome to her deliberation. One
might inundate someone with lots of relevant information, doing so precisely
in order to overwhelm her and hinder her deliberation. One might present
someone with evidence with the aim of emphasizing certain relevant informa-
tion and facts, while intentionally neglecting to mention other information one
acknowledges as relevant (Tsai 2014, 89–90).
In rational manipulation reasons are given, but the process of rational de-
liberation is short-circuited in the listener by some rhetorical device.
Rational persuasion can still infringe on autonomy in very special cases.
First, it can reveal a negative attitude towards one’s interlocutor. Second, it
can preclude an opportunity to engage in rational deliberation (Tsai 2014,
91–92). Neither necessarily applies to the moral reasoner AI presented here.
The moral reasoner AI does not have a negative attitude towards its
user, because it does not have any attitudes at all. It can be interpreted
to have such attitudes, if its user takes the intentional stance towards it
and simply attributes beliefs and desires in order to predict and understand
its behavior (Dennett 1981). But that would be no diﬀerent than taking
an intentional stance towards a thermostat. If John interprets a thermostat
as having a negative attitude towards him, that should not be a reason
to think that John’s autonomy is infringed upon. This is because such an
attribution does not have the same moral signiﬁcance as an attribution of
a negative attitude to another person.
The other exception also does not apply. The moral AI does not preclude
opportunities for rational deliberation. On the contrary, it invites its user
to engage in rational deliberation that they may not have gone through
otherwise. Racist John and people like him are just the kind of people that
Aristotle’s conception of persuasion by argument is intended for. This is
precisely because rational persuasion can appeal to them in ways that other
arguments may not. As it does its work, the moral AI reasoner respects
John’s autonomy, even if it attempts to persuade him to change his racist
beliefs. The objection from paternalism does not apply.2
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5. Conclusion
AI can provide some hope for dealing with the Moral Lag Problem, but
only if it can play a normative role and change how people behave. To do
that, the AI has to be able to provide moral reasons that a rational, reason-
responsive person could be persuaded by. Machine ethics is the only extant
research program that has as its aim modeling human-level moral reasoning
in a computer. So an AI that can help with the Moral Lag Problem will
involve machine ethics and a system that can provide reasons that a rational
agent can be persuaded by.
This argument ﬁrst challenges Savulescu and Maslen’s (2015) proposal
and then makes room for a new and potentially more eﬀective use of AI
for moral enhancement. The sketch of such a system that is provided here
constitutes the positive contribution that the paper makes. This AI system
will generate persuasive arguments using algorithms that formalize moral
reasoning based on ﬁrst-order normative theories, such as utilitarianism or
Kantianism. Contrary to the critic, this system would not be paternalis-
tic in a way that would undermine autonomy. It would provide a way to
reach people that may otherwise be immune to what Aristotle calls scientiﬁc
argument.
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N O T E S
1 It should be noted that the technology discussed here faces formidable technical and
theoretical obstacles. Furthermore, even if these obstacles are overcome there remains the
question whether its development and/or use is morally acceptable. Discussion of these
issues is outside the scope of the present paper.
2 Presumably, devices such as the moral reasoner AI imagined here would be used in
very speciﬁc conditions. Before anyone uses them, they would ﬁrst have to make a decision
to use it, which implies at least tacit consent to being advised in this way. This is yet
another reason to think that the moral reasoner AI is engaging in rational persuasion and
not rational manipulation.
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